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‘Fire Cannot Harm It’: Mediation, Temptation
and the Charismatic Power of the Qur’an
Travis Zadeh
HAVERFORD COLLEGE

Orality and Corporality
The miraculous charisma of the Qur’an, both in this world and the next, forms part
of a larger constellation of traditions recurrent throughout the body of literature
focusing on the excellent qualities (faḍāʾil) of the revelation to Muḥammad. This
genre of writing starts to coalesce around the beginning of the third/ninth century,1
as evinced by the respective muṣannaf collections of ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827)
and Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849), both of which contain sections dedicated to the
subject. With the Faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān of Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 224/
838), we have an early example of an entire monograph organised under this
particular rubric. While the traditions gathered in these collections are drawn from
sayings ascribed to the Prophet, the Companions and early jurists, which were in
circulation during the second/eighth century,2 the genre as a literary form comes to
reﬂect theological concerns as they developed in the course of the third/ninth and
forth/tenth centuries.3
These writings draw inspiration from the Qur’an, which itself repeatedly emphasises
the special nature of the revelation as a central theme. Scholars such as William
Graham and Daniel Madigan have pointed out that one of the unique characteristics of
the Qur’an is its awareness of itself as a scripture very much conﬁgured in terms of an
oral communication.4 A sustained focus within the Qur’an highlights the revelation as
an otherworldly, inimitable articulation. The unbelievers (mushrikūn) consistently
react to the Qur’an with the refrain this is obvious magic (hādhā siḥrun mubīn),5 while
when the jinn listen on they exclaim that this is a wonderful recitation! (qurʾānan
ʿajaban).6 This miraculous intrusion of the divine into human history is repeated in
the Qur’an with the recurring challenge for humankind and the jinn to come together
to try to produce something which could rival the divine revelation received by
Muḥammad.7
As for the collection of the oral revelation into the physical form of writing, one of
the central concerns surrounding early Muslim narratives on the codiﬁcation of the
Qur’an is the question as to what extent the written form of the text reﬂects the
original divine communication to Muḥammad.8 According to Muslim accounts a
bifurcation between oral and written lines of transmission, concomitant with the
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variae lectiones (qirāʾāt) – themselves expressed both orally and textually –
characterises the early dissemination of the Qur’an.9 The dichotomous relationship
between the oral and the textual is further accentuated in a leitmotif which runs
throughout the Qur’anic discourse concerning a divine urschrift, referred to as the
original scripture (umm al-kitāb, Q. 43:4), preserved upon a heavenly tablet (al-lawḥ
al-maḥfūẓ, Q. 85:22).10 This heavenly archetype is very much akin to the pre-existent
Torah of Judaism,11 and is a concept found in other scriptural traditions which stretch
across the ancient religious landscapes of Mesopotamia.12
With the semantic nexus surrounding the words inzāl and tanzīl, the Qur’an depicts
the revelation as a downward movement from heaven to humanity. The charismatic
quality of scripture in both oral and written terms is articulated in Q. 56:77–9, It is a
noble recitation (qurʾānun karīm) in a hidden scripture (kītābin maknūn), which only
the pure touch (lā yamassuhu illā’l-muṭahharūn). Thus, the unique and sanctiﬁed
character of the revelation as manifest both aurally and textually is already expressed
in the Qur’an. The radical uniqueness of the revelation is repeated throughout the
Ḥadīth literature surrounding the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān, in the belief that divine presence
and tranquility (sakīna), directly connected to the Hebrew shekhīnā and the Syriac
shekīnāthā, descends over the body when reciting the Qur’an.13
The Qur’anic discourse refers to the revelation as glad tidings (bushrā), serving as a
guide (hudā) and a mercy (raḥma) for humanity.14 This conﬁguration around the
illuminating power of revelation points to the larger role of the Qur’an in salvation
history. The eschatological importance of the Qur’an is also crystallised in early
Ḥadīth literature. In the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān section of Ibn Abī Shayba’s Muṣannaf, the
Companion Abū Hurayra (d. ca 59/679) is recorded as saying, ‘Blessed is the
interceding (al-shaﬁʿ) Qur’an for the one who possesses it on the Day of
Resurrection’.15 Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) relates on the authority of the
companion Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī (d. ca 81/700) a similar account, ascribed to the
Prophet, ‘Recite the Qur’an, for on the Day of Resurrection it will be an intercessor
(shāﬁʿ) for those who possess it (li-aṣḥābihi)’.16 The idea that the Qur’an can
intercede on behalf of the believer appears as a central feature to the eschatological
currents running throughout the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān literature.17 ʿAbd al-Razzāq in his
Muṣannaf and al-Dārimī (d. 255/869) in his Ḥadīth collection record a saying
attributed to Ibn Masʿūd (d. 32/652–3), famous Companion and early reciter, that the
Qur’an is the ‘rope of God’, an intercessor, whose wonders never cease (lā tanqaḍī
ʿajāʾibuhu).18 In other collections, a similar statement concerning the never-ending
marvels of the Qur’an is ascribed directly to the Prophet.19
Attitudes toward the special status of the Qur’an, both in its oral articulation and its
written form, go through a radical transformation with the controversy surrounding the
question of the temporality of God’s speech and the createdness of the Qur’an, which
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comes to dominate theological debates by the end of the second/eighth century.20 One
of the consequences of this controversy is that the ways in which the oral and written
forms of the Qur’an are conceptualised come to take on explicit theological meanings.
Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), for example, in his Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth, speaks
directly to rationalist theologians (aṣḥāb al-kalām) when he argues that the Qur’anic
aya only the puriﬁed touch it (Q. 56:77–9) and the Prophetic ḥadīth ‘do not travel with
the Qur’an into the land of the enemy’ both demonstrate that the physical codex
(muṣḥaf) is veritably one and the same as the divine, uncreated Qur’an, and not just an
indication (dalīl) of it.21
In contrast, Dāwūd al-Iṣbahānī (d. 270/884), the founding leader of the Ẓāhiriyya,
draws on the same Qur’anic aya to argue that the heavenly Qur’an, which is in a
hidden book (kitāb maknūn), is uncreated, while that ‘which is in our midst’ (bayna
aẓhurinā) is created and temporal. From this, he claims that menstruants and those in
a state of major impurity (junub) may indeed touch the muṣḥaf,22 an opinion which
stands in contradistinction to the dominant juridical discourse on the matter.23
Ultimately, this is a legal position upheld by the later Ẓāhiriyya.24 Such is the case
with Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), the prominent Ẓāhirī jurist of Cordoba, who contends
that the Qur’anic aya only the puriﬁed touch it is not a prohibition (nahī), but a
statement of fact, referring to how angels touch the heavenly scripture; and that the
Prophet himself is known to have sent letters to ritually impure inﬁdels (kuffār),
containing Qur’anic ayas calling them to Islam.25 Ibn Ḥazm takes this as justiﬁcation
for letting menstruants, those in a state of major impurity and inﬁdels all handle the
codex. The position of the Ẓāhiriyya on this issue reﬂects a broader process of trying
to work out the relationship between the divine revelation and its material
manifestation in human existence.
The growing signiﬁcance of the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān literature, in a sectarian milieu
marked by competing visions over the nature and function of scripture, suggests an
attempt at delineating the centrality of the Qur’an, not only vis-à-vis the importance
of Ḥadīth, but also within an increasingly tense theological debate concerning
scripture itself. As a genre, the very function of the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān is to draw
attention to the centrality of scripture, a centrality which is arguably part of the
Qur’an’s self-image, itself very much conceived of as an oral revelation.26 We can
trace within this literature, however, an effort to collapse together the oral and material
expressions of the Qur’an as not only equivalent articulations, but as equally
sanctiﬁed. This process of suturing the oral to the written develops out of a historical
context where the use of writing in the spheres of learning and ritual praxis itself had
been hotly debated.27
Throughout this literature there is a recurring emphasis on the eschatological power
of the Qur’an to intercede on behalf of humanity. This charismatic capacity is often
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conﬁgured through a metaphoric language of corporality, which highlights a
conﬂuence between the oral and material expressions of scripture. The homiletic
force of Abū ʿUbayd’s Faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān leaves no doubt that believers should
embrace the Qur’an for its power of intercession, with an explicit eye toward the Day
of Resurrection. The notion that one who possesses the Qur’an is protected come the
end of time not only accords to the Qur’an a special role in the mediation between the
divine and the human, but, as ﬁgurative language, speaks to the materiality of
scripture, suggesting that through the process of memorisation (ḥifẓ) one internalises
the Qur’an and thus comes to possess it and be protected by it.28 Similarly, the
common ﬁgurative expression found throughout these sources of ‘bearers of the
Qur’an’ (ḥamalat al-Qurʾān) as a designation for those who have memorised and thus
‘carry’ scripture, underscores a further collapsing together of the oral and the physical
in the discursive imaginaire.
As mentioned above, one of the main aims of the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān literature is to
highlight the primary role of scripture in the course of human affairs. This centrality is
echoed in a range of discourses, as, for example, is the case in the various writings
detailing the Prophetic medicine (al-ṭibb al-nabawī) practiced by Muḥammad and the
Companions, where the recitation of Qur’anic ayas is repeatedly used in conjunction
with the preparation and ingestion of herbal remedies.29 Such sentiments concerning
the otherworldly power of the revelation, as expressed in the Qur’an, the Prophetic
Ḥadīth and the sayings of the Companions, point not only to the power of the words,
but also to the special nature of the physical object of the codex itself. Given its
unique importance, it is not surprising to see, from an early period, the material
Qur’an used in an entire range of theurgical practices, from amulets and talismans to
bibliomancy (faʿl al-Qurʾān) and divination.30 The practice, for example, of ingesting
Qur’anic ayas written down on paper or other media comes under scrutiny by early
jurists interested in maintaining the ritual purity of the Qur’an.31 The emphasis on
internalising scripture, both literally and ﬁguratively, gives rise to questions
concerning the charismatic status of the physical Qur’an as a written text.
‘Fire Cannot Harm It’
These inquiries into the power of the Qur’an as text and object intersect not only with
the issues of sanctity (ḥurma) and purity (ṭāhira), but also with a broad range of
problems regarding the nature of the divine message. Of speciﬁc concern is the
relationship between the Qur’an as divine speech and the physical codex as the
receptacle for the word of God. Of the many sources of contention, one particular
Prophetic ḥadīth serves as a site of a sustained debate. Tracing the reception and
interpretation of this saying enables us to survey a diverse set of responses concerning
the nature of the physical codex as a vessel of revelation.
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Abū ʿUbayd is one of our earliest sources for this ḥadīth, which appears in his Faḍāʾil
al-Qurʾān. He relates on the authority of the Companion ʿUqba ibn ʿĀmir (ﬂ. ﬁrst/
seventh century), who heard the Prophet say, ‘If the Qur’an were on an untanned hide
and then thrown into a ﬁre, it would not burn’ (‘law kāna al-Qurʾān fī ihāb thumma
ulqiya fī’l-nār la-mā iḥtaraqa’).32 This statement comes to engender an entire range of
interpretations, all of which make some kind of claim about the nature of the
charismatic power of the Qur’an in relationship to the material world. For his part,
Abū ʿUbayd interprets this saying ﬁguratively to mean that the hide is the heart (qalb)
of the believer, and is the vessel in which the Qur’an is memorised. According to him,
this ḥadīth afﬁrms that the believer who has memorised the Qur’an will not suffer
hellﬁre on the Day of Judgment.33
While this saying disseminates throughout the body of writings focusing on the
faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān in particular, and Ḥadīth literature in general, it is with Ibn Qutayba
in his Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth that we see a fuller exploration into the theological
implications of this individual Prophetic tradition. It is of note that the discussion
concerning the signiﬁcance of this ḥadīth takes place in the context of an explicitly
theological work, which, in the style of a heresiography, sets out to champion the
partisans of Prophetic tradition (ahl al-ḥadīth) over the practitioners of speculative
theology (ahl al-kalām).34 The introduction of this work refutes the ways in which
various factions (ﬁraq), such as the Khawārij, the Murjiʿa, the Muʿtazila and the
Shīʿa, have used and interpreted Prophetic ahādīth to advance positions which Ibn
Qutayaba holds to be heretical.35
Ibn Qutayba opens his discussion by citing a group who argued that this ḥadīth is
patently false, as Qur’anic codices are known to burn just like other books.36 In order
to counter such a claim and to elucidate a saying which seems to invest the physical
Qur’an with a miraculous power to withstand ﬁre, Ibn Qutayba advances three
explanations. First, he quotes the Basran philologist al-Aṣmaʿī (d. 213/828), who
argues, like Abū ʿUbayd in his Faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān, for an allegorical signiﬁcation,
where the hide stands in for a person. Ibn Qutayba explains this to mean that the body
of a man who has memorised the Qur’an will not be punished on the Day of
Resurrection.37 He draws his second explanation from an unidentiﬁed group of people
who assert that, during the lifetime of the Prophet, ﬁre indeed could not harm the
physical Qur’an. This, they explain, served as a miracle (muʿjiza) proving the veracity
of Muḥammad’s prophethood. In these two interpretations lies a divergence between
an allegorical reading, supporting the ﬁgurative internalisation of the Qur’an, versus a
literal reading, which invests the physical muṣḥaf with miraculous power.
It is, however, in his last explanation where Ibn Qutayba engages most obviously with
the question of the material form of the Qur’an in relationship to divine speech. Here
he argues that the antecedent of mā iḥtaraqa (‘it would not burn’) refers not to the
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hide, but to the Qur’an. Such a distinction, between the hide and the text written on it,
separates the Qur’an as the speech of God from the material medium on which it is
recorded. Ibn Qutayba argues that while the leather and ink might burn, the Qur’an
would not, for it is as though God has lifted it up right off the hide and protected
it from the ﬁre. This ﬁnal line of argumentation alludes to the divine urtext of the
Qur’an, as protected by God from all harm.38
Ibn Qutayba, however, when suggesting that God lifts the Qur’an up off the hide, is
quick to distance himself from the theologians (aṣḥāb al-kalām) who argue that the
material codex is merely an indication (dalīl) of the true Qur’an, which due to its
eternality cannot subside in a material manifestation. He stresses that the Qur’an does
exist literally (ʿalā’l-ḥaqīqa) and not ﬁguratively (ʿalā majāz) in its physical form.39
Such a conﬁguration suggests, as some of Ibn Qutayba’s later interpreters have
understood, that the Qur’an as text does indeed have a miraculous power to withstand
ﬁre.40 Needless to say, while this interpretation falls in line with Ibn Qutayba’s
broader proto-Ḥanbalī theology,41 it would seem to run contrary to his position
concerning the human, physical articulation (lafẓ) of the Qur’an, which he held to be
created and temporal.42
It is in the theological realm that a succeeding generation of scholars, such as
al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933),43 Ibn Mahdī (d. ca 385/995)44 and Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015),45
come to interpret this saying, all within a discourse of resolving theological problems
raised in the corpus of Prophetic traditions (i.e. taʾwīl/sharḥ mushkil al-ḥadīth).46
Following in large part Ibn Qutayba, the Ḥanafī jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī offers two
interpretations. The ﬁrst gives a ﬁgurative meaning to the saying, explaining away any
literal attempt to understand how a physical copy of the Qur’an could withstand ﬁre.
The second is akin to what Ibn Qutayba suggests in his third interpretation, namely,
that God protects the Qur’an from burning by lifting the text of the Qur’an up off the
hide.47 Thus, it is the hide which burns and not the Qur’an.
In the case of this particular ḥadīth, we ﬁnd with the Ashʿarī theologians Ibn Mahdī
and Ibn Fūrak an explicit rejection of the notion that the eternal Qur’an itself could
reside in a material medium. They both argue, in contrast, that this saying supports the
Ashʿarī position that the Qur’an, when written on a tablet or on leather, is not actually
residing in a physical form, for it is not possible for divine speech to dwell within the
vessel of writing.48
This view of the speech of God and its relationship to the Qur’an serves as a standard
position in Ashʿarī theology, where divine kalām is an eternal attribute, equivalent
to God’s eternal commandment (al-amr al-azalī), whereas the Qur’an written down in
a material form is an expression (ʿibāra) of divine, undifferentiated kalām.49 Such a
move links the heavenly tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūz) and the Qur’an written in codices
as both mimetic copies of God’s eternal speech. Key to this distinction is the
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separation of ‘inner speech’ (al-kalām al-nafsī), which is an eternal and an essential
quality of God, and ‘articulated speech’ (al-kalām al-lafẓī), which is temporally
expressed.50
It is in such a light that the Ashʿarī theologian al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) turns to this
ḥadīth in his al-Inṣāf fī-mā yujab iʿtiqāduhu, a credal and theological work aimed in
large measure against Muʿtazilī and Ḥanbalī theologians. Al-Bāqillānī argues that by
this saying the Prophet did not mean that the leather, the ink and the written letters of
the Qur’an (al-ḥurūf al-muṣawwara) would not burn, but rather that the eternal speech
of God, which is the Qur’an, cannot be harmed, for it is not conceivable for the eternal
to be burned or destroyed. For al-Bāqillānī, this line of argumentation is explicitly set
against those who argue that the eternal Qur’an dwells in the temporal vehicles of
language and writing and, as such, addresses the Ḥanbalī notion that the human
articulation of the Qur’an is veritably the same as God’s eternal speech.51
Divine Deterrence and Demonic Temptation
Such a panoply of interpretations highlights how this particular ḥadīth is axiomatic of
broader theological issues. One of the most provocative responses in this examination
of the intersection of material existence and divine revelation comes from the Imāmī
jurist, theologian and all around adīb of Baghdad, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044).
In his collected literary and theological lectures, the Ghurar al-fawāʾid wa-durar
al-qalāʾid, he brings to the topic a perspective highly inﬂuenced by Muʿtazilī
theology. Al-Murtaḍā challenges Ibn Qutayba’s analysis of this saying by recounting
a refutation offered by the philologist and exegete Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 328/940).52 In the
process, al-Murtaḍā sets out to demonstrate the folly of both men, while putting forth
an interpretation which to many would appear to be quite radical.
The focus of al-Murtaḍā’s argument centres on the nature of the Qur’an as language
and as a material object. Al-Murtaḍā refutes the claim that there is any charismatic
element to the physical form of the Qur’an which would prevent it from being burned,
either by God lifting up the text off the leather, or by the hide itself withstanding the
ﬂames.53 He also goes on to reject the theory that the physical codex of the Qur’an
was impervious to ﬁre during the lifetime of the Prophet, for if that were the case,
he argues, than why would this particular miracle have been hidden from all
the Companions who related each of the Prophet’s miraculous feats. Furthermore,
al-Murtaḍā ridicules Ibn Qutayba’s suggestion that anyone could just memorise the
Qur’an and thus escape the ﬁre of damnation. He concludes that if this were so, then
everyone who was juridically bound to follow the religious law (i.e. al-mukallafūn)
would need only to rely on memorising the Qur’an and could go about sinning
completely safe in their minds, free from fear of punishment.
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For al-Murtaḍā this ḥadīth functions as a rhetorical adage (ʿalā ṭarīq al-mathal) used
to aggrandise (taʿẓīm) the status of the revelation to Muḥammad.54 Accordingly, the
Qur’an has nothing to do with material elements, not the leather, nor the ink, and thus
is distinct from the written object itself (al-maktūb).55 As he argues:56
The Qur’an in reality (fī’l-ḥaqīqa) does not reside (yaḥull) in leather; as
it is not in leather, this ḥadīth can ascribe burning to leather and not to
the Qur’an. And since this is case, [Ibn Qutayba’s] claim that the hide
is burned and not the Qur’an is pointless, for this is the situation for all
speech (kalām), which is written on a hide or any other material.
On this issue al-Murtaḍā stresses that the Qur’an has no special linguistic superiority
(maziyya), which would separate it from any other form of speech, either poetry
or prose. He argues that the oral and textual dissemination of any given linguistic
expression depends upon temporal preservation. Accordingly, as a written
articulation, it is like any oral expression which has been written down, such as the
poetry of Imrūʾ al-Qays (d. ca 550 AD) or the juridical teachings of al-Shāﬁʿī (d. 204/
820).57 Thus, al-Murtaḍā concludes, if the Qur’an were only written on a single
leather hide and not preserved in the minds of humans, were that hide to burn, then
the sacred text would be lost forever.58
By locating the miracle in something other than the textual expression of revelation,
al-Murtaḍā turns to the role that divine intervention plays in the formation of the
Qur’anic challenge (taḥaddī). To fully understand al-Murtaḍā’s position on this ḥadīth
and its implications for the oral and textual forms of the Qur’an, we must understand
his broader approach to scripture and divine speech. As a student of the Imāmī scholar
al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1032), al-Murtaḍā developed a theology heavily shaped
by Muʿtazilī rationalism, particularly with regard to the justice (ʿadl) of God and
the monotheistic emphasis on God’s oneness (tawḥīd) as determinate factors in the
refutation of an eternal, uncreated Qur’an. Despite this close intellectual afﬁnity with
Muʿtazilī thought, al-Murtaḍā spends a good deal of his energy questioning many of
their teachings. To this end, he dedicates an entire monograph on the inimitability of
the Qur’an, al-Mūḍiḥ ʿan jihat iʿjāz al-Qurʾān, aimed at challenging the theories
promoted by such Muʿtazilī theologians as Abū’l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) and
al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1024), who locate the miracle of the Qur’an in its
linguistic arrangement (naẓm) and eloquence (faṣāḥa), respectively.59 Throughout this
work, which he summarises in his later theological compendium, al-Dhakhīra fī ʿilm
al-kalām, al-Murtaḍā sets out to promote the notion of divine deterrence (ṣarfa) as the
probative dimension of Qur’anic inimitability.
There are several key points to keep in mind when considering al-Murtaḍā’s
interpretation of this ḥadīth. As with his master al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Murtaḍā
distances himself from the early Shīʿī claim that additional ayas were secretly added to
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the Qur’an (ziyāda).60 He too comes to reject the early Imāmī claim that the
ʿUthmānic text is incomplete and contains omissions (nuqṣān),61 a position which
gains favor amongst the Uṣūlīs.62 Al-Murtaḍā, inﬂuenced by the Muʿtazilī doctrine of
the created Qur’an, believes the Qur’an to be temporally produced (muḥdath), and not
eternal.63 Furthermore, he upholds the theory of ṣarfa, namely the idea that God
intervened to prevent humanity from rivaling the Qur’an, as the probative factor of its
inimitability and of Muḥammad’s prophethood. These positions taken together serve
to situate the Qur’an as a temporally disseminated revelation, whose miracle lies
neither in its language nor message, but in divine deterrence.
We should note that the theory of divine deterrence is a position promoted by a
number of early Muʿtazila, such as Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām of Basra (d. ca 220/835),64
along with many of the Baghdad Muʿtazila, as for example al-Rummānī (d. 384/994),
who lists ṣarfa as one of the causes of inimitability in his treatise al-Nukat fī iʿjāz
al-Qurʾān.65 However, a good number of the Muʿtazila object to this theory, as is the
case with al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, who throughout his writings vocally champions
linguistic superiority and eloquence (faṣāḥa) as explanations for Qur’anic
inimitability.66
Al-Murtaḍā, in contrast, argues that the Qur’an is ultimately made up of the eloquence
of the Arabs, and though it might differ from their customary literary form, the
difference is not so great that they would have been unable to match it.67 He rejects
the concept that the Qur’anic miracle is based upon events, future or past, that would
have been unknown to the Prophet (al-akhbār ʿan al-ghuyūb),68 as does he refuse to
recognise the Qur’an as miraculous merely because it appeals to reason and contains
no contradictions.69 The premise that the miracle of the Qur’an lies in its character as
the eternal, uncreated word of God means absolutely nothing to him, for he upholds
the Qur’an as temporally contingent, consisting of letters and sounds, which are
written, recited and heard.70 Like all other forms of linguistic expression, the Qur’an is
meaningful speech (al-kalām al-mufīd), which occurs in time through successive
ordering of words, one word after another.71 In this regard al-Murtaḍā sees no
difference between the linguistic position of the Qur’an and all other forms of
language. For this reason he rejects that the Qur’an is miraculous either on stylistic or
rhetorical grounds.
As for the question of naẓm, he turns to the theory of the Muʿtazilī theologian
Abū’l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, who in his ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa’l-jawābāt championed the
stylistic arrangement (naẓm) and composition (taʾlīf) of the Qur’an as being beyond
the reach of humans, equal to raising the dead or healing the blind.72 For al-Murtaḍā
what is meant by naẓm is the successive arrangement of words (ḥurūf) into a speciﬁc
stylistic form, such that the naẓm of poetry differs from that of prose, as the words are
arranged using a differing stylistic order (tarkīb).73 Though al-Murtaḍā acknowledges
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that the naẓm of the Qur’an differs from all other forms of speech (ḍurūb al-kalām),74
he does not believe this is sufﬁcient cause for the inimitability of the Qur’an. As he
argues, whoever has the power of words is capable of arranging them and placing
them in any given order. Without acknowledging it, al-Murtaḍā sides momentarily
with ʿAbd al-Jabbār, when stating that the superiority of speech does not lie in its
formal stylistic arrangement, as one poet might offer a better poem than a rival, though
both poets share the same metre.75
Though rhetorical eloquence (faṣāḥa), unlike formal genre, has a clear subjective
dimension, for al-Murtaḍā it too does not sufﬁciently explain the problem of
inimitability. On this issue, he challenges ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s premise that the superiority
of the Qur’an occurs through its linguistic excellence. According to al-Murtaḍā, as
mentioned above, the Qur’an is ultimately made up of the eloquence of the Arabs, and
though it might differ from their customary literary form, the difference is not so great
that they would have been unable to match it.76 Al-Murtaḍā does not deny that the
Qur’an is an eloquent expression, but he argues that there is not any form of eloquence
which could be beyond the reach of humankind, and, as such, eloquence itself cannot
form the basis of a miracle.77
Having discounted all other theories, al-Murtaḍā turns to divine intervention as the
only viable explanation as to why the Arabs were unable to meet the challenge. On
this issue, he emphasises the absurdity of the claim that due to the superior eloquence
of the Qur’an the Arabs were unable to produce something to rival even the shortest
chapter, Sūrat al-Kawthar, which consists of only three ayas. Such a hypothesis is
anathema to al-Murtaḍā’s notion of language and scripture. Though one of the
obvious consequences of ṣarfa is the devaluation of the Qur’an as a special linguistic
form, the power of God to intervene in the course of human history is in no way
diminished. On this point al-Murtaḍā rejects the claim made by ʿAbd al-Jabbār and
others which holds that if one believes in divine intervention then the Qur’an ceases to
be a miracle.78 Al-Murtaḍā refutes this by explaining that the Qur’an is indeed an
inimitable miracle, which humankind is incapable of equalling or approaching, but
that the cause of this inimitability is not located in the temporal medium of language.
According to him the doctrine of ṣarfa is the only way of understanding why the
Qur’an remains unrivalled.
Al-Murtaḍā pushes the point, claiming that there is no form of eloquence which would
be beyond human capacity.79 He holds that the Qur’an is not a miracle in and of itself
(bi-nafsihi), nor does it break with the natural course of events (ʿāda) merely through
its eloquence; rather, it is an indication of what is the miracle in truth (ʿalā’l-ḥaqīqa),
namely that God has prevented humankind from achieving its likeness.80
Furthermore, al-Murtaḍā sees the doctrine of ṣarfa as the only way to demonstrate that
the Qur’an is not a demonic deception or temptation aimed at misleading the world.81
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For him, the problem with the theory that eloquence is the cause of Qur’anic
inimitability is that humans have no way of determining the degree of eloquence
possessed by the Devil or the jinn.82 Since language is temporal and contingent, it is
well within the Devil’s power to master in order to tempt humanity. The notion that
God prevented the Arabs from outdoing the Qur’an, according to al-Murtaḍā,
sidesteps this problem altogether, as it locates the miracle not in language, which is
necessarily contingent, but in a divine act.
The syllogistic logic buttressing his argumentation is based in the premise that God is
just and does not seek corruption (istifsād);83 thus no miracle of God can be evil;84 as
the Devil may readily be capable of using eloquent language to tempt humankind, it is
not possible that the miracle of the Qur’an be based purely on a vehicle of expression
within the Devil’s capacity. Therefore, only a divine act which prevents humanity
from rivaling the linguistic form of the Qur’an can serve as the miraculous proof of the
truthfulness and benevolence of the revelation to Muḥammad.85
Such a position concerning the status of the revelation as ultimately no different from
any other linguistic form naturally divests the physical codex of the Qur’an of any
charismatic power. It is for this reason that al-Murtaḍā is averse to the notion that the
material form of the Qur’an possesses a miraculous capacity to withstand ﬁre. Though
al-Murtaḍā’s support for ṣarfa gains a signiﬁcant amount of support in Imāmī Shīʿī
circles, eloquence (faṣāḥa) and stylistic arrangement (naẓm) are never entirely
disregarded as probative causes of Qur’anic inimitability.86 Furthermore, as within
Sunnī traditions, there is a broad acceptance amongst the Shīʿa of the miraculous
power of the Qur’an as both a text and an object. The Akbhārī scholar al-Majlisī
(d. 1110/1698), for example, in his monumental work the Biḥār al-anwār, outlines a
range of charismatic powers accorded to the Qur’an, both as an oral revelation and
as a physical form,87 echoing a discourse already present in the Kitāb al-kāfī by the
Shīʿī Ḥadīth scholar al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941).88
Without an Intermediary?
In contrast to the Muʿtazilī, Ashʿarī and Imāmī systems of thought, theologically the
Ḥanābila are foremost in according to the Qur’an an eternal presence within the
material world. Throughout the heresiographical literature, the followers of Aḥmad
ibn Ḥanbal are infamously accused of believing in a kind of divine indwelling (ḥulūl),
when they argue that there is no difference between the recitation of the Qur’an
(al-qirāʾa) and that which is recited (al-maqrūʾ). In many of the heresiographies, this
notion is paralleled to the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation, positioning the
sounds heard during recitation as themselves equal to divine speech, even though
expressed through a human intermediary.89
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The Ashʿarī assertion that the material Qur’an, in its temporal form as text and sound,
is an expression (ʿibāra) of the undifferentiated, eternal speech of God, is directed as
much to the Muʿtazilī argument for the created Qur’an as to an unrestricted Ḥanbalī
belief that the eternal word of God manifests directly in the temporal plane of human
existence. This theory of mimetic mediation is echoed in Māturīdī kalām, similar in
many points to Ashʿarī thought. Thus, on the relationship between eternal divine
speech and the temporal letters and sounds of the Arabic Qur’an, the Māturīdī
theologian Abū’l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115), following in large part the Ashʿarī
position, states that the Māturīdī imāms of Samarqand strongly disagree with the
Ḥanbalīs, who, he argues, believe that that which is written in the codices and is
recited from the Qur’an is the same as the eternal word of God.
According to Abū’l-Muʿīn, the Ḥanbalī belief suggests a divine indwelling in a
temporal vehicle – a position that evokes a Christian-sounding notion of
transubstantiation.90 In contrast, Abū’l-Muʿīn advances the Māturīdī view that
writing the Qur’an in codices, reciting it on the tongue, and preserving it in the heart
all point (dālla) to divine speech as a mimetic reproduction (ḥikāya) and expression
(ʿibāra), but that none of these activities truly make the essence of God’s eternal
speech reside in temporal vehicles. He stresses that ‘the word “God”, mentioning God,
worshipping God, and writing expressions which point to God, are not the same as
God’s very essence’.91 To demonstrate this, Abū’l-Muʿīn draws on the analogy of
translation to describe how it is that the speech of God, which is an eternal and
indivisible divine attribute, can be expressed in the Arabic Qur’an. He argues that this
reﬂects the same process as when ‘a translator (tarjumān) expresses (yuʿabbiru)
through an expression (ʿibāra) which is not the same as the original expression and
through a language which is not same as the original language’.92
In contrast to this portrayal, which fails to perceive a heterogeneity amongst the
Ḥanbalīs on this issue, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the famed Ḥanbalī reformer,
argues that while human recitation (tilāwa) replicates the uncreated speech of God, the
temporal vessel through which it is articulated is created. Thus, the human voice and
the ink in codices, which render the speech of God through the form of the Qur’an, are
both created. Divine speech, he argues, is itself nonetheless uncreated.93
Ibn Taymiya records a debate between al-Qāḍī Yaʿqūb (d. 486/1093) and Ibn ʿAqīl
(d. 513/1119),94 which is itself indicative of a movement amongst many Ḥanbalīs
to distance themselves from the claim that the uncreated, eternal speech of God is
manifested in temporal vessels such as the human voice and the written word.95 Ibn
Taymiyya, however, develops this argument further by explicitly reformulating
the meaning of eternality as a description of God’s speech. Thus, he sets out to
examine the equation of an uncreated Qur’an with an eternal Qur’an. In doing so
Ibn Taymiyya does not wish to theologically strip the Qur’an, as the speech of God, of
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its eternality; rather, he seeks to qualify the concept of what eternal, divine speech
means.
To this end, the situation is slightly more complicated than Wilferd Madelung
suggests when he argues that Ibn Taymiyya disavowed ‘the Ḥanbalite school doctrine
of the eternity of the Qur’an’.96 To be sure, Ibn Taymiyya on various occasions argues
that the pious forefathers (salaf) never explicitly stated that the speech of God was
eternal (qadīm); rather, according to him, they only claimed that it was uncreated
(ghayr makhlūq).97 Yet, in the course of several legal opinions (fatāwā) where these
ideas are formulated, Ibn Taymiyya recognises that the uncreatedness of divine speech
is itself an indication of its eternality. To this end, he upholds, albeit in a qualiﬁed
sense, that the speech of God is eternal and that the Qur’an is itself this divine speech.
As Ibn Taymiyya outlines several times, the pious forefathers believed that God
continues to speak as He wishes (‘lam yazal Allāh mutakalliman idhā shāʾa’), and it is
in this sense that he argues that divine speech is eternal.98 In support of this claim, Ibn
Taymiyya afﬁrms that ‘the words (kalimāt) of God have no end (lā nihāya lahā)’.99
He makes this move in order to re-examine the meaning of qadīm as a qualiﬁer of
God’s speech, arguing for the radical alterity of divine, uncreated kalām,100 which
begins in and returns to God.101 This is done in direct opposition to the Ashʿarī and
Māturīdī theologians who characterise God’s eternal speech as undifferentiated
meaning (maʿnā wāḥid), a position which, as we have seen, ultimately suggests that
the revelation to Muḥammad is a translation into Arabic made by Gabriel, insofar as
the Arabic Qur’an is a temporal expression of the eternal, indivisible speech of God.
Ibn Taymiyya repeatedly baulks at such an idea as abhorrent.102 Furthermore, his
qualiﬁcation on the eternality of divine speech is also directed to those who, within the
framework of Ḥanbalī theology, equate the ink of the codices and the sounds of the
human recitation as being the very same as the eternal speech of God. This is also a
notion which Ibn Taymiyya fervently rejects.103
It is of note that, despite these vocal objections, the structural outline of Ibn
Taymiyya’s theology of divine speech strongly echoes Ashʿarī and Māturīdī
frameworks, particularly regarding the notion of intermediation between divine,
uncreated eternal speech and the material realm of temporal existence. As Ibn
Taymiyya argues, the Qur’an is the speech of God, which is established in the codices
(huwa muthbat fī’l-maṣāḥif). This divine speech disseminates from Him
(muballaghan ʿanhu); nonetheless it is heard from reciters (qurrāʾ), and not heard
directly from God. To clarify this, Ibn Taymiyya draws the analogy of how humans
can see heavenly bodies, such as the sun or moon, either directly (bi-ṭarīq
al-mubāshara), or through an intermediary (bi’l-wāsiṭa), such as a reﬂection in water
or a mirror. Likewise, he argues, humans hear uncreated, divine speech through an
intermediary; however, just as the vision of the sun or moon in water is a reﬂection of
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these heavenly bodies, so too is the speech of God through the intermediary of the
physical codex and the human voice also a reﬂection of this divine, uncreated
speech.104
For Ibn Taymiyya this ‘reﬂection’ does not in any way distort the formal quality of the
revelation; it is not translated from undifferentiated speech into Arabic, and in this
regard his conception of mediation is distinct from the Ashʿarī and Māturīdī doctrinal
position on this issue. As Ibn Taymiyya argues, the nature of the Qur’an, as
unmediated divine speech, in its very essence is an Arabic articulation.105 Such a
delineation suggests a more immediate presence of the uncreated, eternal speech of
God as it refracts through the material realm, written and intoned.
In a similar vein, the famous Ḥanbalī mystic ʿUthmān ibn Marzūq (d. 564/1169) is
recorded as having formulated a parallel distinction: ‘faith is uncreated in its words as
well as in its works; the movements of man are certainly created, but the eternal looms
(yaẓhar) in them, just as the speech [of God] looms in the utterances of man [when
reciting the Qur’an]’.106 It is thus not surprising to hear how Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal
himself interpreted the ḥadīth that ﬁre would not burn the Qur’an to mean that the
person whose heart has memorised the scared scripture would escape the ﬁre of
damnation,107 suggesting that by internalising the Qur’an the body becomes a vessel
protected by divine speech. As Ibn Taymiyya argues in his reformulation of the
signiﬁcance of the uncreated Qur’an, the speech of God is intoned in the body of the
believer through acts of memorisation and recitation; to this end he cites, on several
occasions, the Prophetic ḥadīth ‘a belly without a bit of the Qur’an in it is like a
broken-down house’,108 suggesting a full internalisation of divine speech within the
temporal vessel of the human body.109
While we can readily survey a broad theological spectrum concerning the status of
revelation as manifested in a physical form, in terms of praxis the Qur’an in the daily
lives of Muslims, both as text and object, often takes on an other-worldly power. Such
sentiments concerning the unique role of the revelation, as expressed in the Qur’an,
the Prophetic Ḥadīth, and the sayings of the Companions, not only point to the power
of the words, but also to the special nature of the material form of the Qur’an itself.110
Given its unique importance, it is not surprising to see, from an early period, the
physical Qur’an used in a wide array of practices, such as the making of amulets and
talismans and the tradition of bibliomancy, not to mention the ingestion of speciﬁc
ayas for medicinal and divinatory purposes.111 Although such practices of veneration
toward the Qur’an as a material object have a very early history, many already present
in a nascent form by the second/eighth century, with the rise of Muʿtazilī rationalism
the power of the physical Qur’an emerges as a theological point of continued debate.
It is thus inside the framework of what evolve into pre-existing categories that
theologians came to question how it was that ﬁre could not harm the Qur’an.
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